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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 70-40

-

Doe v. Bolton

Here, for your consideration, is a memorandum
on the second abortion case. What this would accomplish
is the striking of the Georgia statutory requirements as
to (1) residence, (2) confirmation by two physicians, (3)
advance approval by the hospital abortion committee, and
(4) performance of the procedure only in a JCAH accredited hospital. Thus, at this point (pending determination
of the appeal in the Fifth Circuit) the District Court has
stricken certain provisions of the Georgia statute and we
would strike additional ones.
What essentially remains is that an abortion may
be performed only if the attending physician deems it necessary "based upon his best clinical judgment, 11 if his judgment
is reduced to writing, and if the abortion is performed in a
hospital licensed by the State through its Board of Health.
This, I should point out, does not mean that it may be performed in a facility that is not a hospital. Some of you may
wish to take that step, too.
I might say that this was not the easiest conclusion
for me to reach. I have worked closely with .§ltnery ism;y
hospital committees set up by the medical profession itself,
a n d I have seen them operate over extensive periods. I can
state with complete conviction that they serve a high purpose
in maintaining standards and in keeping the overzealous surgeon's knife sheathed. There is a lot of unnecessary surgery

- 2 -

done in this country, and intraprofessional restraints of
this kind have accomplished much that is unnoticed and
certainly is unappreciated by people generally.
I have also seen abortion mills in operation and
the general misery they have caused de spite their being
run by otherwise "competent" technicians.

ll

I should observe that, according to information
contained in some of the briefs, knocking out the Texas
statute in Roe v. Wade will invalidate the abortion laws
in a majority of our States. Most States focus only on
the preservation of the life of the mother. Vuitch, of
course, is on the books, and I had assumed that the Conference, at this point, has no intention to overrule it. It
is because of Vuitch' s vagueness emphasis and a hope,
perhaps forlorn, that we might have a unanimous court
in the Texas case, that I took the vagueness route.
Sincerely,

~~- !1.

.,

T~: The Chief Just ic e

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr ·
Mr.
Mr.
1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
No. 70-40

STATF.Bculated:
Recirculated:

[May -, 1972]
Memorandum of MR. J us'riCE BLACKMUN.
In this appeal the Georgia criminal abortion statutes are under constitutional attack. The statutes,
~§ 26- 1201 to 26- 1203 of the State's Criminal Code,
formulated by Georgia Laws 1968, 1249, 1277, are set
forth in the Appendix.' They have not been tested J\
constitutionally in the Georgia courts.
Section 26- 1201 defin es criminal abortion. Section
26- 1202, however, removes from that definition abortions "performed by a physician duly licensed " in
Georgia when, "based upon his best clinical judgment ....
an abortion is necessary because"
" ( 1) A continuation of the pregnancy would endan-11
ger the life of the ! rer ant woman or would ~riously
and penuaneptQ: ij ur_ her health /? or
"(2) The fetus would very likelY be born with a
grave, permanent, and irrc"'m
" ediable mental or physical
aefect" or
"(3) The pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory rape."

_,
-

Douglas
Brennan
Stewart
White
Mar· shall /
Powell V
Rehnquist

From: Blac1cmun, J.

Mary Doe et al., Appellants,
On Appeal from the
v.
United States District
Arthur K. Bolton , as AttorCourt for the Northern
ney General of the State
District of Georgia.
of Georgia, et al.

1

Justice
J1.:stice
Justice
Justice
Jt:stice
Justice
Justice

L

The italicized portions of the statutes in the Appendix a rc those·
held unconstitutional by the District Court.

S/Jsi7 :J..
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Section 26-1202 then specifies a number of prerequisites for the abortion if it is to qualify under the
except10n. These are (1) and (2) residence of the
woman in Georgia, (3) reduction to writing of the performing physician's medical judgment and written concurrence in that judgment by at least two other Georgia
licensed physicians, (4) performance of the abortion
m a hcensed and "accredited" hospital. ( 5) approval
in advance 6y a hos\ital abortion committee, (6) cert1 cat10n m a rape situation, and (7), (8), and (9}
mamtenance and confid en h ahty of records. There is
a provision for judicial determination of the legality of a proposed abortion on petition of the ~ir~~
law officet· or of a close relative, as therein clefincdO
the " ·oman, and for expeditious hearing of that petition.
There .is also a provi;'ion giving a hospital the right not
to admit an abortion patient, and giving any physician and any hospital employee or staff membrr the
"ri'ght not to participate in the procedure because of
~1 or religious grounds.
Section 26-1203 provides that a person convicted of ; - / ()
criminal abortion shall be punished by imprisonment
for not less han one nor more than 10 years.
eorg1a s~te ~ ( ). \
As appellants ackno,,·lcc ge/ t 1c _
is patterned after the American La''" Institute's Model
Penal Code ~ 23ir.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1062).
Other States have legislation based upon the Model
Penal Code. Sec Ark. Rtats. §§ 41-303 to 41-310 (Supp.
1971); ~Health & Safety Code §§ 25950-55.5 (West
Supp. 1972); Co]Q1 Rev. Stats. 40-2-50 to 40-2-53
(Perm. Cum. Supp. 1967); Del. Code §§ 1790- 1793
(Supp. 1970); Kap . Stat. § 21-3407 (Supp. 1971); ~
Code, Art. 43, §§ 137- 139 (Repl. 1971); ~ Mea Stat.
§§ 40A-5-1 to 40A- 5-3 (Supp. 1971); N. C. Gen. Stat.

-

r'

-

~Brief,

at 25, n. 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.

LQ

?
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~ 14-45.1 (Supp. 1971 ) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 435.405 to
435.403; S. C. Code ~~ 16- 87 to 16- 80 (Supp. 1971);
Va. Code ~~ 18.1- 62 to 18.1-62.3 (Supp. 1071). Mr.
:ru;tce Clark has described some of these States as having ''led the way.'" Rel}glon, Morality, ana Abortwn:
A- Constitutwrial Appraisal , 2 Loyola U. (L. A. ) L. Rev.
1' 11 ( 1969).
I

On April 16, 1970, Mary Doe,'~ 23 other individuals
(nine described as Georgia-licensed physicians, seven as
nurses registered in G eorgia, five as Georgia clgrgymeu.
a;:;'d two as Georgia social workers), and two non profit
Georgia corporations, instituted tl1is action in the Northern District of Georgia against the State's Attorney Geneml, the District Attorney of Fulton County, and the
Chief of Police of the city of Atlanta. The plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment that the Georgia abor~n
statutes were unconstitutional in their entirety. They
also sought injunctive relief restraining the defendants
and their successors from enforcing the challenged
statutes.
Mary Doe alle~d:
( 1) She was a 22-year-old Georgia citizen, married,
and nine weeks pregnant. She had three living children.
The two older ones had been placed in a foster home
because of Doe's poverty and inability to care for them.
The youngest, born July 19, 1969, was with adoptive
parents. Doe's husband had recently abandoned her
and she \Vas forced to live with her indigent parents
and their eight children. She and her husband, however,
had become reconciled. He was a construction worker
and only sporadically employed. She had been a mental
patient at the State Hospital. She had been ad vised
her with less
m at a7l abortion could be Jerformed
3

The n:une is a pseudonym . Complaint, Appendix 7.
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II

she was carrying. She would be unable to support or
care for the new cli'ilrl.
(2) On March 25, 1970, Doe made ~.pp lication to
the Abortion Committee of Grady Memorial Hospital,
Atlanta, to be considered for a therapeutic abortion
under § 26-1202 of the Georgia Code. Her application was denied 16 days later, on April 10, when she
"·as eight weeks pregnant, on the ground that her situation was not one within the reach of i: 26-1202 a .4
(3) Because of this c emal of her application, oe
'"as fac7d with the alternatives of either relinquis~
"her right to decide when and how many children she
win bea~" or seeking an abortion illegal under the
Georgia statutes. This was a violation of rights guaranteed her by the Firstd Fourth, Fifth, Kl£1!1, and Fourteenth Amendments. She sued "on her own behalf
and on behalf of all others similarly situated."
The other plaintiffs claimed the Georgia statutes
"chilled ancrae£erred',.--tfiem froi
racticin their respective professions an , thus, eprived them of t e1r
constitutional nghts. Those plaintiffs also purported
to sue on their own ochaiT And on behalf of otrp-s
similarly situated.
A three-judge District Court was convened. An offer
of proof as to Doe's identity was made but the court felt
it unnecessary to receive that proof. The case was
~d on thulcading§ and interrogatories.
By its per curiam opinion the District Court held that
all the laintiffs had standing, but that only Doc presente
con roversy. On the merits. the
those portions of §~
Mary Doc, by her an~wrrs to interrogatories, stated that her
application for an abortion \Yas approved at Georgia Baptist Hospital on May 5, 1970, but that she was not approved as a charity
patient there and had no money to pay for an abortion. Appendix
64.
1
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1202 (a) and (b) (3) that would limit legal abortions
to the three situations specified; § 26-1202 (b)(6) relatmg to cerbHcabon m a rape situation; and
§ 26- 1202 (c) authorizing the court proceeding upon
the petition of the circuit law officer or a designated
relative of the woman. Declaratory reliefl accordin ~yr
was granted. The court, however, uphe d the ot er
parts of the statute and denied altogether the request
for an injunction. 319 F. Supp. ID48 (ND Ga. 1970).
Claiming that they are entitled to broader relief, the
plaintiffs have taken a direct appeal pursuant to 28
U. S. C. § 1253. The decision on jurisdiction was postponed to the hearing on the merits. 402 U. S. 941
(1971).
The defendants filed a direct cross appeal but this
was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 402 U. S. 936·
(1971). We are advised by the appellees, Brief, at 42,
that an alternative appeal on their part is pending in
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The extent, therefore, to which the decision below is adverse to the appellees, that is, the extent to which
portions of the Georgia statute were held to be unconstitutional, technically is not now before us. 5 Swarb
v. Lennox, 405 U. S. 191, 201 (1972).
II

Our decision today in Roe v. Wade, ante, at - ,.
'establishes (1) that the case is properly here on direct
appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, for the three-judge District Court specifically denied the injunctive relief the
plaintiff-appellants requested; (2) that, despite her
pseudonym, we may accept as true Mary Doe's existence
and her pregnant state on April 16, 1970; (3) that the
What we decide today, however, may well have implications for ·
the issues raisrtl by the appellees' appeal pending in the Fifth
Circuit.
5

I
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constitutional issue is substantial; ( 4) that the termination of Doe's and all other Georgia pregnancies existing
in 1070 has not rendered the case moot; and (5) ~
Doe and her class, that .is, pregnant Georgia women,
d~g to maintain the actl~l?_9~ _Qo_J2--;..0sent a justiciable controversy:~=J usticiaole controversy status of the
other plaintiff-appellants-physicians, nurses, clergymen , social workers, and corporations-is Irs>: certain
but, inasmuch as Doe and her class are recognized, 1s
perha )S a matter of no Teat Sl ·nifica11ce. We cone uclc, ho1Yever. that the ph sician-a) )e ants. who arc
Georgia-licensed doctors consultcc
y women about
pregnancies, also wescnt a ·usticiable ont
d s~ite the fact t 1at the record does not disclose that any
one of them has been )rosecutc , or threatened, ~
v10 ation of the State's ahortjgp stp t pte§t The physicta"n is the pen;on against whom these criminal statutes
directly operate in the event he procures an abortion
that does not qualify under the statutes' exception and
with respect to ''"hich all the statutorily prescribed conditions are not met.
In holding that the physicians, while theoretically
havin5 standing, did not wesent a usticiablc contro~crsy, the District :ourt seems to have relied primarily
on Poe v. -ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961). There a
sharply divided court dismissed an appeal from a state
court on the ground that it presented no real controversy justifying the adjudication of a constitutional
issue. But the challenged Connecticut statute , deemed
to prohibit the giving of medical advice on the usc of
contraceptives, had been enacted in 1879 and , with
only one apparent exception, no one had ever been
1~osecuted under it. Georgia's statute. in contrast, is
recent and not moribund , Furthermore, .it is the successor to other Georgia abortion statutes under which,.
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we arc told/ physicians have been prosecuted. The
present case, in our view, is clo~cr to Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), where the Court recognized
the right of a schoolteacher. though not charged criminally, to challenge her State's anti-evolution statute.
See also Gris·wold Y. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 481
( 1965).
The parallel claims of the nurse, clergy, social worker,
and corporate appellants are another step remoyccl. As
to them, the Georgia statutes operate less directly. Not
being licensed physicians. the nurses and the others arC'
in no )Osition to render mec 1ca advice. They "·ould
l5c reached by the abortion statutes only in their capacity as accessories or counsellor-conspirators. We
conclude that we need not pass upon the status of
these additional appellants in this suit for the issues
are sufficiently and adequately presented by Mary Doc
and by the physician-appcllan ts, and nothing is gained
or lost by the presence or absence of the nurses, the
clergymen, the social workers, and the corporations. See
Roe v. TV ade, ante, at-.

III
The appellants attack the Georgia abortion statu tcs
on several grounds: (A) invalid restriction of an absolute fundamental right to personal and marital privaQ.Y; (B) v....
_.a..:.g._·u....,c_ncss; (C) deprivation of procedural
and substantive due process; (D) improper limitation
to Georgia residents; and (E) denial of equal protection.
We consider these claims in turn.
A. Tl~1rt, in varying contexts, has recognized a
right of personal privacy and has rooted it in the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Bill of Ri gh ts, or in
th e latter's penumbras. See E1'senstadt v. Baird,
U. S. - , (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
G

Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22.
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U. S., at 484; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 5G4
(1969); Loving Y. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541- 542 ( Hl42);
Pierce v. Society of Sislers, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer
'"· Nebraska, 262 U. 8. 390 (1923).
The appellants assert that the scope of this right of
perso11af privacy includes, for a woman, the right to
clec~ninate an existing but
pregnancy w1tliout any state interfereuce or control
\Yl;atsoe~ They argue that if, by Griswold, one
is protected in deciding to limit the size of her family
by tho use of contraceptives, she deserves to have that
right equally protected by having a choice to terminate
an unwanted pregnancy due to contraceptive failure.
See Mr. Justice Clark's article, cited above, Religion,
Morality and Abortion: A Constitutional Approach, 2
Loyola U. (L. A.) L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (1969).
They further argue that the present Georgia statutes
must be viewed historically, that is, from the fact that
prior to the 1968 A~t an abortion in Georgia was not
criminal if performed to "preserve the life" of the mother.
See the 1933 Georgia Criminal Code, ~ 26-1102, which
\vas the codification of Acts 1876, No. 130, ~ 2, p. 113.
And when so vie\Yed, they contend, Geor ia herrtoforc
I"ias g1ven httle, and certainly not first, consi era 1011
to the un born child.
P maily, It is argued that the statute does not adequately protect tho woman's right. This is so, it is
said, because it would be physically and emotionally
damaging to Doe to bring a child into her poor, "fatherless, 7 family, and 15'ecause aavances 111 medicine and in
mecgcal techni9J_lesnave made 1t safer for a woman to
have a medically induced abortion than to Eear a child.
Tlrus a statute "whiCh requires a woman to carry an
unwanted pregnancy to term infringes not only on a

Uiltvantca

7

Appellants' Brief 25.
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fundamental right of privacy but on the right to life
itself."
vVe a ree that a woman's interest in makin the fundamental persona ecisiOn whet 1er or not to bear an
unwanted child is within the scope of personal rights
protected by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments,
as articulated in the decisions cited above. Appellants'
contentiOn, however, that the "·oman's right to make
tho decision is absolute-that Georgia has either no
valid interest in regulating it, or no interest strong·
enough to support any limitation upon the "·oman's
sole determination-is unpersuasive.
. The appellants themselves recognize that a. century
ago medical knowledge was not so advanced as it is
today, the techniques of antisepsis were not known,
and an abortion )rocedure was dangerous for the pregnant woman. To restnct t e ega 1ty o the abortiOn
to the situation where it was deemed necessary, in
medical judgment, for the preservation of the woman's
life was only a natmal and expected line drawing in
the exercise of the legislative judgment of that time.
A State is not to be reproached for a past judgmental
determination of this kind made in the light of then
existing medical knowledge. It is Qlerefore illogical
and unfair to argue, as the appellants do, that, because the earlier emphasis was on the preservation of
the woman's life, the State's present professed mterest
h1 the · tion of embryomc
fetal
is somehow to be downgraded. T at argument condemns the
'State for past "•vrongs" and also denies it the rjgb ~
'to readjust its views and emphases in the light of the
more advanced knowledge and techniques of today.
In any event, it is clear that Georgia's concern historically has not been for the mother alone. The cases
decided unc r the 1876 Act have
various ways to the unborn.

a1ill

"lifi'
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specify ·when life begins. On this questwn there is no
consehsus even amoli'g those trained in the respective
disciplines of medicine, or philosophy. or theology.
In related contexts we have rejected the claim that
an individual has an urilimited riO'ht to do as he )]cases
\Yith 1is oc y..
ee, or example, Jacobson "· .llfassachusetts, 197 U . S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination),
and Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (Hl27) (compulsory

70-4Q-OPINION
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A ~

sterilization). Except to note that the State's interest
grows stronO'er
the woman a) xoaches term \\'e need
llOii
e 111eate that interest with reater detail in order
to recogmze t at it is a' "compellin g" state interest. As ~
such, it ma constitutional] be asserted when th e State ;JJ"-~
does so ,vith a) )ro )riate reO'ard for fun amcnta 1n 11
Vl( ua.l rights.
Cantwell Y. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296,
307 (1940). T1e woman's )ersonal rio·ht, therefore, is
~1ot unlimited.
e a ancec agamst the Stat~ _jo
Interest.
r
Consequently, we cannot automatically strike down
tho remaining features of the Georgia statute simply
because they restrict any right on the part of tho
woman to have an abortion at will. The inguiry must
br one that examines with p articularity the impact
of th e statute u pon the right, as it relates to th e state
m terest being assorted. We turn to t h1s mqmry m
Part C, infra. First, ho"·evcr, we consider the appellants' alternative theory that the statute as a whole must
fall because it is unconstitutionally va ue.
B. The ao·u
argument centers m t 1e proposition
that, "·ith t e 1strict Court's having stricken the statutorily stated reasons£ it stl r ma1ns a cr m or a
"1cian to perform an abortion except when, as~ 26-1202 (a)
ase - U)Oil his est c1111 1 ·u 0'
an abortion is necessary." It is said that tho word
" necessary" 1s so vague that it does not warn the physician of what conduct is proscribed; that the statute is
"-holly without objective standards and is subject to
diverse interpretations; and that doctors will choose
to err on the side of caution and will be arbitrary.
One answer to this, of course, is that this state of
affairs, if it is unfortunate, has been brought about
by tho appellants' success in the District Court. Before
portions of the statute ,\-ere stricken, it possessed the

as

~

.b/

r
·7

yt,;
/

f,ufl

nu 1
,bz

~0 .J
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objective standards specifically stated. Now that those
standards have been removed, it is the appellants who
complain that the statute has become vague.
Be that as it may, the net result of the District Court's
decision is that the abortion determination, so far as
the physician is concerned, is made in the exercise of
his professional, that is, his "best clinical judgment"
in the light of all the attendant circumstances. He is
not now restricted to the three situations specified. Instead, he may range farther afield wherever his medical
judgment, properly and profess.iollally exercised, so dictates and directs him.
The vagueness argument is set at rest, we feel, by
the decision only last Term in United States , .. Vuitch,
402 U. S. 62, 71-73 (1971), when it was raised wfth
respect to a District of Columbia statute outlawing abortions "unless the same were done as necessary for the
preservation of the mother's life or health and
under the direction of a competent licensed practitioner
of medicine . . . . " The Court interpreted the statute
to bear upon psychological as well as physical wellbeing, and, having done so, concluded that the term
"health" presented no problem of vagueness. "Indeed,
\Yhether a particular operation is necessary for a patient's
physical or mental health is a judgment that physicians
are obviously called upon to make routinely \Yhenever
surgery is considered." 402 U. S., at 72. So here,
'\vhether, in the words of the Georgia statute, "an abortion is necessary," is a judgment that a Georgia physician will be called upon to make routinely.
We agree with the District Court, 319 F. Supp., at
1058, that the medical judgment may be exercised in
the light of all factors-emotional,
onom1c psychoTogiCal familial, physical-relevant to
. e 1-being of
tlie lfatient. Despue the appellants' s eming protestation to the contrary, all these facto s have a bearing

70-40-0PINION
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upon health. This, of course, allows the attending
physician the room he needs to make his medical judgment. And it is room that operates for the benefit,
not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.
C. Mary Doe's due process attack on the statute
focl..!.§._es on (1) the restnch on of abortions to accredited
h'OsiJitS, (2) the pregnant woman's asserted inability
to make a presentation to the hospital abortion committee, and (3) the alleged cumbersome and timeconsuming features of the confirming process. Appellant
physicians argue that by subjecting their individual medical judgments whether a patient should have an abortion to additional consultation and committee approval
unduly restricts their right to practice their profession,
and thus deprives them of due process.
Resolution of these issues, a.s has been noted, reguires
an in uir into the acle uac
t
· tions
or encroaching upon the fundamental persqpa.l privacy
..;ight of Mary Doe recognized in Part A. supra.
The first aspect concerns accreditation by the Joint
Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals. This
Commission is a nonprofit corporation without governmental sponsorship or overtones. No question is raised
about the integrity of the organization or about the
high purpose of the accreditation process. 8 That procSinre its founding, JCAH has pnr~ued the "elusive goal" of
defining the "optimal setting" for "quality of services in hospitals."
JCAH, Accreditation Manual for Hospitab, Foreward (Dec. 1970).
The Manual's Introduction states the organization's purpose to·
establish standard~ :mel conduct accreditation programs that will
afford quality medical care "to give patient~ the optimal benefits
that medical science has to offer." Thi~ ambitious nnd admirable
goal is illustrated by .JCAI-I'::; decil:lion in 1966 "to raise and strengthen
the standards from their present level of minimum essential to the
level of optimum achievable. . . ." Some of the;:;e "optimum
achie\'able" standards required are: disclo~ure of hospital ownership and control; a dietetic service and written dietetic policies;
8
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the Commission is not
opera 1011 at least one year.
cere 1tatwn 1s a so epcn clent upon the hospital's having, among other things,
a radiology de partment, a mass casualt )1"00'rL m and
nuclear medicine facilities. 'hose requirements do bear
upon general l1osp1tal qua hty and status, but they impress us as havin little bearinrr on a hospital's qualification as a )]ace where an a ortwn-or any o 1er
par wu ar me 1ca or sur ical )roccdurc-j nay be safcl:x;
per ormed. The Model cnal Code ~ 2~0.3 does not,
for example, include this requirement. And see Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Abortion
Act (Second Tentative Draft. August 1970). contain-·
ing no accredited hospital 1imitatiou.' 0
n written di~n~trr plan for ma~~ rmcrgrneir~: :> mwlrar mrclim[
scn·ires progrmn; fnrilit ir.~ for hrmntology, chrmistry. microbiology,
clinirnl mirro~ropy, :mel ~rro-immnnolog~· ; n profr~sion:d librar~· nnd
clornment drlivrry ~c·n·irC'; a radiology progr:tm; n ~orin I scn·iceR
plrtn ndmini~trrrcl by a (]u:; lifiC'd sorinl workrr; :mel a ~prrial rare
unit.
n "The .Joint Commi~sion nC'ithrr adnlC'atrs nor Oj)JlO~r~ an~r pnrtirul:tr po8ition wit b rr~prrt to rlrrt i\·r abortion,:." Lrtt rr dntrd
July 9, 1971, from John I. Brrwrr, 1\'I. D. , Commi~~ioncr, .TCAH,
to t hr Rorkrfrllrr Foundation. Brirf for amici, AmC'rirnn Collrgc
or Ohstetri('inns :tile! G.\'II('('Oiugi.-<t", ct a! .. Jl. A-:l.
10
Some stntulr~ do not hn\·r thr .JCAII nrrrrditrcl hospitnl re(]uirrmC'nt. Al:ts. Stnt. ~ ll.l5.0GO (1970); llnw. Sr~~. Law~, 1()70,.
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We therefore hold that the JCALI accreditation requirement does not withstand constitutional scrutiny
in t h e present cot1'tc:-...::t. It is a requirement that simply
is not "based on differences that are reasonabl related
to the purposes of t 1e Act in w uc It IS oun . Morey
\'. Doud
That is not to
say, as the appellants themselves concede, Brief, at 4
tha t Georgia may not or should not adopt stand::J:rds
for 11Censmg a(] fil mTi b es where abortio11s may be )er·formec so ong as t ose standards have a reasonable
rcratiO nship to t he ObJective the State i"eeks.:,to
accomp hsf1.
' l' he second aspect of the attack, relating to the hospital abortion committee and the pregnant woman's
access to it, is based pnmarily on Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U. S. 254 (1970), concerning the termination of
"·elfare benefits , and Wisconsin v. Conslantmeau, 400 *
iJ. R. 433 ( 1!)71), concernin g th g posting of an alcoholic's
name. It is sugg~tecl that it is still a badge of infami'
'TD1 many minds" to hear an illegitimate child, ancl that
the Georgia system enables the committee members'
1
personal vie\YS as to extramarital sex rcl
and
"
pums 1ment therefor, to govern their decisions. . _
'l'h1s approach obviously is one founded on suspicion
and. o11e that discloses a lack of conficle11ce in the integrity of physiciap s. It appears also to lace undue
emphasis on the abortion conum %¥ and on Its seem11J..i
iso lation. The pregnant woman's principal counsel in
the abortion decision is her personal physician. It is
he ,,·ho makes the initial recommendation. Presumably, and hopefully-if she has been candid with him-

---

Art. 1; N.Y. Penni Laws 125.05.3 (i\1d\innry 1971-1972 Supp.).
wa~hin~ton';; ~tntutr ha~ the rrquircmrnt but rouplrs it with the
altt'rnntil'<" of "a cdiral fnrilitv
. b1· the state board
of health." "\Vnsh. Rev. Cudr § 9.02.070 (1971 Supp ..

-
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,he knO\VS all asm;cts of her case. He serves her essentially as the family physician so esteemed in memory.
Following accepted medical procedure, his recommendations would be conveyed with underlying reasons to the
two other physicians who, pursuant to § 26-1202 (b) (3),
must separately examine alld confirm. At that point
the medical judgment is complete. To each and all
of these physicians the woman has full access.
We see nothing in the Georgia statute that denies
access to the hospital abortion committee by or Qn
behalf of "th e pregnant woman. If the access point
alone were Involved, we wo.;;'ld not be persuaded to strike
down the committee provision on the unsupported assumption that access is not provided. It is perhaps
worth noting, also, that the abortion committee has
a function of its own. It is a committee of the hospital
and its members are members of the hospital's medical
staff. The committee's composition usually is a changing one. In this way its work burden is more readily
accepted ancl is shared. The committee's function is
protective of the hospital. It enables 1l1e hospital appropnately to be adVised that its posture and activities
are in accord with legal requirements. It is to be remembered that the hospital is an entity and that it,
too, has legal rights and legal obligations. The committee's focus is on it, and not on the pregnant \vomun.
To sa.y also that physicians will be guided in the1r
hospital committee decisions by their predilections on
extramarital sex unduly narrows the issue to pregnancy
outside marriage. This case involves more than extramarital sex and its product. In addition, the suggestion
is necessarily somewhat degrading to the conscientious
physician, particularly the obstetrician, whose professional activity is concerned with the physical and mental
"·elfare, the woes, the emotions and the concern of h:is
feminine patients. He, more than anyone else, is
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knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and is aware
of human frailty, so-called "error," and needs. And
the good physician-despite the presence of rascals in
the medical profession, as in all others, we trust that
most physicians are "good"-will have a sympathy and
an understanding for the pregnant woman patient that
probably is not exceeded by any of those who participate in other areas of professional counseling.
Saying all this, however, does not settle the issue
of the constitutional propriety of the presence of the
hospital abortion committee in the Georgia statutory
system. Viewing the statutes as a whole, we see no
pertinence in the system for the advance a) ); oval b
the a ortwn commi tee. Under § 26-12 2 (c) a hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion and
not to have an abortion committee. Furthermore, a
physician or any other employee is free to refrain, for
moral or religious reasons, from participating in the
abortion procedure. These provisions obviously are
in the statute in order to afford some protection to
the individual and to the denominational hospital in
the observance of religiously dictated precepts, and in
business decisions. From this point of view, § 261202 (e) affords adequate protection to the hospital and
little additional protection is proyided bv the abortion
committee prescribed by § 26-1202 (b)(5).
W c conclude that the interposition of the hospital
abortion committee IS unnecessary and is un dul restnc IV
1e patien s ng s an neec s t at, at this
point, have already 5'"een medically delmeated and substantiated by her personal physicia.n. To ask more·
serves neither the hOspital nor the State.
The third aspect of the attack focuses on the "time
and availability of adequate medical facilities and personnel." It is said that the system imposes substantial
and irrational roadblocks and "is patently unsuited'"

f(
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to prompt, determination and "makes a mockery of
Georgia's attempt to justify its statute."
Time, of course, is critical in the abortion process.
'Risks during the first trimester of pregnancy arc admittedly lo,ver than during later months.
The appellants purport to show by a local study 11
of Grady Memorial Hospital (serving indigent residents
in Fulton and DcKa.Ib Counties) that the "mechanjcs
of the system itself forced . . . discontinua.tion of the
abortive process" because the medium time for the
workup \Yas 15 days. The same study shows, however,
that 27 o/o of the candidates for abortion \Yere already
13 or more weeks pregnant at the time of application,
that is, they were at the end of or beyond the first
trimester when they made their request. It is too much
to say, as the appellants do, that these persons "were
victims of the system over \Yhich they had no control."
If hi her risk was incurred because of abortions in the
second rather tha11 1
rs r 1
1
t 1a t
risk was due to delay in application, and 110t to the
alleged cumbersomeness of any system. We note. in
passing, that appellant Doe had no delay problem herself; the decision in her case was made well withjn the
first trimester.
lt should be manifest that our rejection of the accredited hospital requirement and, more Important, of
the hospital abortion com1i-iittee's advance approval
eliirunates the major groun ds of the attack hasecl on
the system's delay and the lack of faci lt tiCs. There
remams, however, the required confirmation by t\\·o
Georgia licensed physicia.ns in the recommenclatio1~ of
the pregnant \\·oman's O\Yn consultant. \Vc conclude
that this, too, must fall.
L. Baker nne! l\I. Frermnn , Abortion Surveill;<nrr nt Grad~"
l\1rmorial Hospit[ll , Crntrr for Di~r:tRr Control (U. 8. Drpartmrnt
of HE\\·, PH,;:i) , .Tunr and .lui)' 1071.
11
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The statute's emphasis, as has been repetitively noted,
is on the attending physician's "best clinical judgment
that an abortion is necessary." That should be sufficicllt. The reasons for the presence of the confirmation
step in the statute are perhaps apparent, but they arc
insufficient to "·ithstand conc:titutional challenge. We
arc cited to no other voluntary medical or surgical procedure-not even childbirth-for which Georgia requires
confirmation by t\YO other physicians. If a physician
is licensed by the State, he is recognized by the State
as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgmcn t.
If he fa.ils in this, professional censure or deprivation
of his license are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no rational connection
with the patient's needs and unduly infringes on the
r)Eysician's rio-ht to ractice. The attendant physician
w1 know when a consultatiOn is advisable-the doubtful situation, the need for assurance when the medical
decision is a delicate one, ancl the like. Physicians have
followed this routine for decades and know its usefulness and benefit. It is still true today that "Reliance
must be placed upon the assurance given by his licell"e,
issued by an authority competent to judge in that respect, that he [the physician l possesses the requisite
qualifications." Dent Y. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114,
122-123 (1889). That is the measure. Sec United
States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S., at 71.
D. The Georgia residence requirement is said to be
violative of th · ht to travel stressed in Shapiro Y.
wm pson, 3~4 U. S. 618, 629 (1969), anc ot 1cr cases.
We see no restriction in the statute on the travel right.
One is no less free, because of the statute, to come to
or to depart from the State of Georgia. And it can
be said that the residence requirement is not without
"torne relab ohslup to the avmla61hty of )Ost- )roccdure
me ical care or 1c a or e patient.

J
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Nevertheless. " ·e cannot a]2j)J ove the constitutionality
::.
of the residence requirement. It is not based on a
po~ of preserving stat e-supported facilities for t1 eorgia
residents, for the bar apphes as we ll to pnvatc hospitals
and to privately retained physician s. There is no intimation, either. that Georgia facilities are utilized to
capacity in caring for Georgia residents. Just as the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Const. , Art. IV, § 2,
protects persons who enter other States to ply their
trade, TVard "· Maryland, 79 U. S. (12 \Vall.) 418, 430
(1870); Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 , 248- 256
(1898), so must it protect persons who enter Georgia
seeking the medical services available there. A contrary holding would mean that a State may limit to
its own residents the general medical care available
within its borders. This >ve cannot approve.
E. The last argument on this phase of the case is
the usual one, namely, that the Georgia system is violative of equal protection because it discriminates against
the poor. The appellants do not urge that abortion
should be performed by others than licensed physicians,
so we have no argument that because the wealthy can
better afford physicians. the poor should have nonphysicians made available to them. The appellants
acknowledge that the procedures are "non-discriminatory
in ... express terms," but they suggest that they have
produced invidious discriminations. The District Court
rejected this approach out of hand. 319 F. Supp., at
1056. It rests primarily on the accreditation and ~
proval and confirmation requirements, discussea above,
and on the assertiOn that j o5 ot ttl¢ 159 counties in
Geor ia have no accredited hospital. Appellants' JurisIctlona tatemen
ppen IX
We have set aside
the accreditation approval and confirmation requirements, however, and, with that, the discrimination argument necessarily collapses in all significant aspects.
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IV
The appellants complaill, finally, of the District
Court's denial of injunctive relief. A like claim was
made in Roe v. Wade, ante, a t - . We declined decision there insofar as injunctive relief was concerned,
and we decline it here. We assume that Georgia's
prosecutorial authorities will give full recognition to the
judgment of this Court.

In summary, we hold that the JCAH accredited hospital provision and the requirements as to approval by
tE e hos )ital abortion committee, as to confirmab on by
two additional physiCians, an as to residence in Georgia
are all unconstitutjppgL SpeCifically, the following portions of ~ 26- 1202 (b) are stricken :
(1) Subsections (1), (2), and (5).
(2) That portion of Subsection (3) following the
words, "Such physician's judgment is reduced to writing."
.... ,
.J
(3) That portion of Subsection ( 4) following the / ~\
words, "Such abortion is performed in a hospital~ ~
./~by the State Board of Health."
(U The judgment of the District Court is therefore modified and, as so modified, is
Affirmed.

MR. JusTICE PowELL and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST
took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.

APPENDIX

Crimiual Code of Georgia
(The italicizcd portions arc tho~e hcld unronstitutionrrl by the·
District Court)

CHAPTEH 26-12.

ABORTION.

26-1201. Criminal Abortion. Except as otherwise'
provided in section 26-1202, a person commits criminal
abortion when he administers any m.edicine, drug or
other substance '"hatever to any woman or when he uses
any instrument or other means '"hatever upon any woman
with intent to produce a miscarriage or abortion.
26-1202. Exception. (a) Section 26-1201 shall not
apply to an • abortion p0rfonned b a 1hysicia11 dul
licensed to practice mec wmc an
1ap or
. or
,
'lts amended, based upon ius best ch mcal JUdgment that
an abortion is necessary because:
(1) A continuatwn o} 'bw J>reunancy would endanger
the life of the pregnant 1uoman or would seriously and
permanently injure her health; or
(2) The fetus would very likely be born with a grave,
permanent, and i1Temediable mental or physical defect;
or
(3) The pregna11cy r('S1llted from forcible or statutory
rape.
(b) No abortion is authorized or shall be performed
under this section unless C'ach of the following conditions
is met;
(1) The pregnant woman requesting the abortion certifies in writing under oath and subject to the penalties
of false swearing to the physician who proposes to perform. the abortion that she is a bonn, fide legal resident
of the State of Georgin,.
22
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(2) The physician certifies that he believes the woman ~~ AV , is a bona fide resident of this State and that he has no .......- v
information which should lead him to believe otherwise.
(3) Such physician's .judgment is reduced to writing
and concurred in bv at least two other physicians dulx
licensed to r ctice medicine and sur er
w 10 certi y in writing that based upon their separate
personal medical examinations of the pregnant woman,
the abortion is, in their judgment, necessary because of
one or more of the Teasons enumerated above.
( 4) Such abortion is performed in a hospital licensed
by the State Board of Ilealth~nd accredited by the Join 9
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals,
( 5) The performance of the abortion h as been approved in advance by a commi t e of the medical staff
of the hos ital in which t 1e operation is to e 1er orme .
his committee must be one established and maintaine
in accordance with the standards promulgated by theJoint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, and
its approval must be by a majority vote of a membership
of not less than three members of the hospital's staff;
the physician proposing to perform the operation may
not be counted as a member of the committee for this
purpose.
(6) If the proposed abortion is considered necessary
because the woman has been raped, the woman makes a
written statement under oath, and subject to the penalties
of false swearing, of i he date, time and place of the rape
and the name of the rapist, if known. There must be
attached to this statement a certified copy of any report
of the mpe made by any law enforcenwnt officer or
agency and a statement by the solicitor general of the
judicial circuit where the rape occurred or allegedly occurred that, according to his best information, there is:
probable cause to believe that the rape did occur.

~err
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(7) Such \rritten opinions, statements, certificates, and
concurrences are maintained in the permanent files of
such hospital and are available at all reasonable times
to the solicitor general of the judicial circuit in which
the hospital is located.
(8) A copy of such written opinions, statements. certificates, and concurrences is filed with the Director of
the State Department of Public Health 'vithin ten (10)
clays after such operation is performed.
(9) All \\Titten opinions, statements, certificates, and
concurrences filed and maintained pursuant to paragraphs
(7) and (8) of this subsection shall be confidential records and shall not be made available for public inspection
at any time.
(c) Any solicitor general of the judicial circuit in
which an abortion is to be performed under this section,
or any person who would be a relative of the child witMn
the second degree of consanguinity, may petition the superior court of the county in which the abortion is to be
performed for a declaratory judgment whether the performance of such abortion would violate any constitutional or other legal nghts of the fetus. Such solicitor
general may also petit:ion such court for the purpose of
taking issue with complia·nce with the requirements of
this section. The physician who proposes to perform the
abortion and the pregnant woman shall be respondents.
The petition shall be heard expeditiously and if the court
adjudges that such abortion would violate the constitutional or other legal rights of the fetus, the court shall
so declare and shall restrain the physician from performing the abortion.
(d) If an abortion is performed in compliance with
this section, the death of the fetus shall not give rise to
any claim for "Tongful death.
(c) Nothing in this section shall require a hospital to
admit any patient under tho provisions hereof for the
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purpose of performing an abortion, nor shall any hospital
be required to appoint a committee such as contemplated
under subsection (b) ( 5). A physician, or any other
person who is a member of or associated with the staff
of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital in which an
abortion has been authorized, who shall state in writing
an objection to such abortion on moral or religious
grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical
procedures which will result in the abortion, and the·
refusal of any such person to participate therein shall
not form the basis of any claim for damages on account
of such refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory
action against such person.
26-1203. Punishment. A person convicted of criminal abortion shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than 10 years.
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MR. C'RIEF J u s'rJCE B11HGEn. concurring.
I agree that, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, the abortion statutes of Georgia and Texas
impermissibly limit the performance of abortions necessary to protect the health of the pregnant ·women, using
the term health in its broadest medical context. See
l'uitch v. Unit ed Stales, 402 U. S. 62, 71- 72 (1971). I
am somewhat troubled that the Court has taken notice
of various scientific and medical data in reaching its
conclusion; however, I do not believe that the Court
has exceeded the scope of judicial notice accepted in
other contexts.
In oral argument. counsel for the State of Texas informed the Court that early abortive procedures \VCre
routinely permitted in certain exceptional cases, such
as nonconsensual pregnancies resulting from rape and
incest. In the face of a rigid and narrow statute, such
as that of Texas, no one in these circumstances should
be placed in a posture of dependence on a prosecutorial policy or prosecutorial discretion. Of course,
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States must have broad power, within the limits indicated
in the opinions. to regulate the subject of abortions, but
where the consequences of state intervention are so severe, uncertainty must be avoided as much as possible.
For my part. I " ·ould be inclined to allow a State to require the certification of two physicians to support an
abortion, but the Court holds otherwise. I do not believe that such a procedure is unduly burdensome, as are
the complex steps of the Georgia statute, which require
as many as six doctors and the use of a hospital certified
by the JCAH .
.._CPY~
____
.Q.LJ~'1~""-~_ru_c_e_~J-----=I~d~o_l:.:_lO:::_t:..:,read the Court's holding today as having the
S\reeping
attributed to it by the dissenting Justires; the dissenting views discount the reality that the
vast majority of physicians observe the standards of their
profession , and act ouly on the basis of carefully deliberated medical judgments relating to life and health.
Plainly, the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortion on demand.
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Memorandum of MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN.
In this appeal the criminal abortion statutes recently
enacted in Georgia are challenged on constitutional
grounds. The statutes are §§ 26-1201 through 26-1203
of the State's Criminal Code, formulated by Georgia
Laws, 1968 Session, 1249, 1277- 1280. In Roe v. Wade,
ante - , we today have struck down, as constitutionally
defective, the Texas criminal abortion statutes that are
representative of provisions long in effect in a majority of
our States. The Georgia legislation , however, is different
and merits separate consideration.
I
The statutes in question are reproduced as Appendix A,
.1 As the appellants acknowledge, 2 the 1968
statutes are patterned upon the American Law Institute's
:M:oaer" Penal Code, § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft,
19~ as Appendix B, post - . The ALI
proposal has served as the model for recent legislation
in approximately one-fourth of our Statcs. 3 The uew

post -

1

Chief Justice
Justice Douglas
Justice Brennan
Justice Stewart
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Powell ~
Justice Rehnquist

Tho portions italicir.ed in Appendix A arc those held unconstitutional by tho District Court.
"Appellant;;' Brief 25 n. 5; Tr. of Oral Arg. 9.
a See Roe v. lVade, ante- n. 37.
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Georgia provisions replaced statutory law that had been
in effect for more than 90 years. Georgia Laws 1876,
No. 130, § 2, at 113.< The predecessor statute paralleled
the Texas legislation considered in Roe v. Wade, ante,
and made all abortions criminal except those necessary
"to preserve the life" of the pregnant woman. The new
statutes have not been tested on constitutional grounds
in the Georgia courts.
Section 26-1201, with a referenced exception, makes
abortion a crime, and § 26-1203 provides that a person
convicted of that crime shaH be punished by imprisonment for not Jess than one nor more than 10 years. Sec'' The nrtin• proYi~ion~ of thr lRif\ ~t[ilntr wrrr:
"Rrrtion 1. Be it ennctPd. etc .. Thflt from nne! nftrr thr pn~~ngc
of thi~ Art. tlw wilful killing of nn unborn rhild, ~o far drvcloprd ns
to ho onlinnril~· rnllrrl 'quirk,' h~· fln~· injurY to thr mothrr of surh
rhild. whieh would hr mnrdN if it ro~nltrd in tlw drntl1 of ~nrh
mothor. ~hnll br guilt~· of n l'rlmn·. find pnni~hnhl0. h~· clrflth or
impri~omnrnt for lifo. n~ t hr jmy tr.,·ing the rn~r mn.1· rrrommond.
"Ror. 11. Be it further en orterl, Thnt. r1·rr~· prr~on 11·ho ~h.11l
ndmini~tPr to an~· " ·nmnn prrg-nnnt with [\ rhild. mw modirinr. drng.
or ~uhstflnro \\'hntrvor, or ~ hnll u ~r or omplo~· .111~· in~trnmrnt or
othor m oan~. 11·ith intont thoroh1· to do~tro~· ~urh rhild. 1mlo~~ thr
sfl me ~hall lwn~ hcc•n nrrr~~a r~· to prc~crvr thr life of ~nch mothrr.
or ~ hflll hnYr hrrn [tch· i~Pd b~· two J>hY~iC"inn~ to br rwcC'~~flr~· for surh
pmposr. shall. in rfl~r thP drflth of ~ urh rhild or mothrr hr thcrcb~r
prodnrPcl , ho dPrl:-trwl guilt~· of :m fl,:~;tult IYith intrnt to murder.
"Srr. III. Be it furth er enorterl. Thnt fln~· pC'r~on who ~hall wilful!~· nclmini~tC'f to nn~· prrgnnnt wmnnn nn~· mcdirinr, dmg or slrbstrtnc·p, or a n.1·t bing whntr1·C'r , or "hnll rmploY [t m · in~t mnwnt or
mrnns whatr,·rr, with intrnt thrn•hy to pror11rr thr mi,:cnrringr or
abortion of 1111\' ~neh woman . mllr"~ tlw ~nnw ~hnll htlYr brrn nrrrssn r.'· to pre..;rn·r 1hr lifr of >'llrh 1romnn. or ~hnll hf11·r lwrn nc!Yioed
h~· two ph~ ·~ irifln~ 1o hr nrcr~":u~· for th:tt p11rpo~r. ~ h:tll. upon ron,·ir1 ion, lw ptmi"hrd a:< JH'l'..;erilwd in ~rrt ion 4;)10 of thr Rr,·i ~c cl
Codr of Georgia."
~ houlcl be notre! th:1t thr ~rro nd ,:rrtion, in rontra"t to thr fir~t.
mnkrs no sprcific rcfrrrnrr to quiekrning. The ~cc tion \Yas soon
rons1 rurd. ho\\·r,·rr. to po""<'"" t hi~ linr of drmnrr[ttion. Taylor v .
State, 105 Ga. R4fi, ;)3 S. E . 190 (1899).

It
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tion 26-1202 (a) states the exception and removes from
§ 1201's definition of criminal abortion, anci thUS makes
JlOr;crimimll, m1 Ubortlon ''p~rformed by a physician duly
licensed" in Georgia -,\:hen. "based urmr1 hisbe~t- clinical
judgment ... an abortion is~~ary because
" ( 1) A continuation of the pregnancy would endanger ~e life of the pregnant woman or would
seriously and permanently injure her health, or
"(2) ~fetus would very likely be born with
a grave, permanent, and irremediable mental or
physical defect, or
"(3) The pregnancy resulted from forcible or
statutory rape." 5
Section 26-1202 also requires, by numbered subdivisions
of its subsection (b). that. for an abortion to be authori?:ed or performed as a noncriminal procedure, additional
c~must be fulfilled. These are (1) and (2) residence of the woman in Georgia; (3) reduction to writing
of the performing physician's medical judgment that an
abortion is ,iustified for one or more of the reasons specified by ~ 26-1202 (a), with written concurrence in that
judgment by at least two other Georgia-licenseQ..Qbysicians, based upon their separate personal medical examina IOns of the woman; (4) performance of the abortion
in a hospital licensed by the State Board of Health and
also a~editeCT by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals; (5) advancr approval by an abortion
committee
,...____ of not less than threcmcm ers o the hospi tal's staff; (6) certifications in a rape situation; and
(7), (8), a,nd (9) maintenance and confidentiality of
records. There is a provision (subsection (c)) for ,iudi"Tn rontrnst with thr ALT moclPI. tlw (;porgia ~tatutr makrs no
sprrifir rdrrrncr to prrgn:mry rr~ulting from incr"t. vVc were n~
Rurrd h~· thr Rt:tfr nt rr:ngnmrnt th:1t this w:w hrrausr thr Rtntutc':;
rcfrrrmr to "rapr" wa~ intrndrd to inrludr inrr~t. Tr. of Rcnrg. 32.
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cial determination of the legality of a proposed abortion
on petition of the judicial circuit law officer or of a close
relative, as therein defined. of the unborn child. and for
expeditious hearing of that petition. There is also a
provision (subsection (e)) giving a hospital the right not
to admit an abortion patient and giving any physician
and auy hospital employee or staff member the right, on
moral or religious grounds, not to participate in the
procedure.
II
On April 16, 1970, Mary Doe/ 23 other individuals
(nine described as Georgia-licensed physicians, seven as
nurses registered in the State, five as clergymen, and two
as social workers), and two nonprofit Georgia corporations that advocate abortion reform, instituted this federal action in the Northern District of Georgia against
the State's attorney general. the district attorney of
Fulton County, and the chief of police of the city of
Atlanta. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
that the Georgia abortion statutes were unconstitutional
in their entirety. They also sought injunctive relief
restraining the defendants and their successors from enforcing the statutes.
Mary Doe alleged :
"(1) She was a 22-year-old Georgia citizen, married, and nine weeks pregnant. She had three living
children. The two older ones had been placed in a
foster home because of Doe's poverty and inability
to care for them. The youngest, born July 19, 1969,
had been placed for adoption. Her husband had
recently abandoned her and she was forced to live
with her indigent parents and their eight children.
She and her husband, however, had become recon6

Appellants by their complaint, App<:>nclix 7, allege thal the name
is a pseudonym.
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cilcd. He was a construction worker employed only
sporadically. She had been a mental patient at the
State Hospital. She had been advised that an abortion could be performed on her with less danger to
her health than if she gave birth to the child she
was carrying. She would be unable to care for or
support the new child.
"(2) On March 25, 1970, she applied to the Abortion Committee of Grady Memorial Hospital, Atlanta, for a therapeutic abortion under § 26-1202.
Her application was denied 16 days later, on April
10. when she 'vas eight weeks pregnant. on the
ground that her situation was not one described in
§ 26-1202 (a). 7
"(3) Because her application was denied, she was
forced either to relinquish 'her right to decide when
and how many children she will bear' or to seek an
abortion that was illegal under the Georgia statutes.
This invaded her rights of privacy and liberty in
matters related to family, marriage, and sex, and
deprived her of the right to choose whether to
bear children. This was a violation of rights guaranteed her by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The statutes also denied·
her equal protection and procedural due process and,
because they were unconstitutionally vague, deterred hospitals and doctors from performing abortions. She sued 'on her own behalf and on behalf
of all others similarly situated.' "
The other plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia statutes
"chilled and deterred" them from practicing their respective professions and deprived them of rights guaranteed
In answer::; to intcrrogatoric::; Doc stnted that her application for
an abortion was approyed al Georgia Bapl i~l Ho::;pibl on May 5,
1970, but that she was not approved as a rharit~· patient there and
had no money to pay for an abortion. Appendix 04.
7
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by the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Those plaintiffs also purported to sue on their own behalf
and on behalf of others similarly situated.
A three-judge district court was convened. An offer
of proof as to Doc's identity was made, but tho court
deemed it unnecessary to receive that proof. The case
was then tried on the pleadings and interrogatories.
The District Court, per curiam, 319 F. Supp. 1048
(ND Ga. 1970), held that all the plaintiffs had standing
but that only Doc presented a justiciable controversy.
On tho merits, the court concluded that the limitation
in the Georgia statute of the "number of reasons for
which an abortion ma.y be sought," id., at 1056, improperly restricted Doe's rights of privacy articulated in
Griswold Y. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), and of
"personal liberty," both of which it thought "broad
enough to include the decision to abort a pregnancy,"
id. , at 1055. As a consequence, the court held invalid
those portions of ~~ 26- 1202 (a) and (b )(3) limiting
legal abortions to tho throe situations specified; ~ 261202 (b)( 6) relating to certifications in a rape situation;
and ~ 26-1202 (c) authorizing a court test. Declaratory
relief was granted accordingly. The court, hmvevcr, held
that Georgia's interest in protection of health, and the
existence of a "potential of independent human existence" (emphasis in original), id., at 1055, justified state
regulation of "the manner of performance as ''"ell as
the quality of the final decision to abort," id., at 1056.
and it refused to strike clown the other provisions of
the statutes. It denied tho request for an injunction ,
'id., at 1057.
Claiming that they 'vere entitled to an injunction and
to broader relief. the plaintiffs took a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. ~ 1253. We postponed dPcision on
jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 402 U. S. 941
(1971). The defendants also purported to appeaL pm-
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suant to § 1253, but their appeal was dismissed for \vant
of jurisdiction. 402 U. S. 936 (1971). We are advised
by the defendant-appellees, Brief 42, that an alternative
appeal on their part is pending in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The extent,
therefore, to '"hich the Di:strict Court decision was adverse to the defendants, that is, the extent to which
portions of the Georgia statutes were held to be unconstitutionaL technically is not now before us.' Swarb v.
Lennox, 405 U. S. 191, 201 (1072).

III
Our decision in Roe v. Wade, ante - , establishes
( 1) that, despite her pseudonym. we may acceptas true,
for this case. Mary Doe's existence and her pregnant
state on April 16, 1970; (2) that the constitutional issue
is substantial; (3) that the interim termination of Doe's
and all other Georgia pregnancies in existence in 1970
has not rendered the case moot; and ( 4) that Doe presents a justiciable controversy and has standing to maintain the action.
Inasmuch as Doe and her class arc recognized, the
question whether the other appellants-physicians,
nurses, clergymen. social workers, and corporationspresent a justiciable controversy and have standing is
perhaps a matter of no great consequence. We conclude,
however, that the physician-appellants, who arc Georgialicensed doctors consulted by pregnant women, also present a justiciable controversy ::mel do have standing despite the fact that the record docs not disclose that any
one of them has been prosecuted. or threatened with
prosecution, for violation of the State's abortion statutes.
The physician is the one against whom these criminal
statutes directly operate in the event he procures an
8

What \YC' drrid<' i oclaY nl)\'iou~l~· ha~ impliration~ for i hr
in the clcfrndants' appra l pending in the Fifth Cirruit.

mi~rcl

i~~ur~
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abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions
and conditions. The physicimH~j_)pe~lts, thcreforer
assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment.
They should not be--reQUireato await a.nCT undergo a
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.
Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F. 2d 833, 839-840 (CA6
1971); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986, 990-991
(Kans. 1972).
ln holding that the physicians, while theoretically possessed of standing, did not present a justiciable controversy, the District Court seems to have relied primarily
on Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961). There a
sharply divided Court dismissed an appeal from a state
court on the ground that it presented no real controversy justifying the adjudication of a constitutional issue.
But the challenged Connecticut statute, deemed to prohibit the giving of medical advice on the use of contraceptives, had been enacted in 1879, and, apparently with
a single exception, no one had ever been prosecuted under
it. Georgia's statute, in contrast, is recent and not
moribund. Furthermore, it is the successor to another
Georgia abortion statute under which. we are told, 9
physicians were prosecuted. The present case, therefore,
is closer to Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968),
"·here the Court recognized the right of a school teacher,
though not yet charged criminally, to challenge her
State's anti-evolution statute. See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 481.
The parallel claims of the nurse, clergy, social worker,.
and corporation-appellants are another step removed and
as to them, the Georgia statutes operate less directly.
Not being licensed physicians, the nurses and the others
are in no position to render medical advice. They would
be reached by the abortion statutes only in their capacity
n Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22.

I
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as accessories or as counselor-conspirators. We conclude
that we need not ~ss upon the status of these-aaciitional appclla;t"s in thi~uit, for the issues -;re -;ufficiently and adequately presented by Doe and- the physician.:appeuant8,ana nothing is gained or lost by_ tho·
presenccm:-- absence of the n~ses,th;-clergymen, the
social workers, and the corporations. See Roe v. Wade,.
ante, a t - .

IV
The appellants attack on several grounds those portions of the Georgia abortion statutes that remain after
the District Court decision: undue restriction of a right
to personal and marital privacy; vagueness; deprivation
of substantive and procedural due process; improper restriction to Georgia residents; and denial of equal
protection.
A. Our decision today in Roe v. Wade, ante, sets forth
our conclusim1tnat apregnant woman does not have an
absolute constitutiOnal right to an abortion on her deIliana. "Wfiat is said tfiere is applicable here and need
11ot'6e repeated.
B. The appellants go on to argue, however, that the·
present Georgia statutes must be viewed historically,
that is, from the fact that prior to the 1968 Act an
abortion in Georgia was not criminal if performed tcr
"preserve the life" of the mother. It is suggested that
the present statute, as well, has this emphasis on the
mother's rights, not on those of the fetus. Appellants
contend that it is thus clear that Georgia has given little,
and certainly not first, consideration to the unborn child ..
Yet it is the unborn child's rights that Georgia asserts
in justification of the statute. Appellants assert that
this justification cannot be advanced at this late date.
Appellants then argue that the statutes do not adequately protect the woman's right. This is so because-

70-40-0PINION
DOE v. BOLTON

10

it would be physically and emotionally damaging to Doe
to bring a child into her poor "fatherless" ' 0 family, and
because advances in medicine and medical techniques
have made it safer for a woman to have a medically
induced abortion than for her to bear a child. Thus, "a
statute which requires a woman to carry an Ul1\mnted
pregnancy to term infringes not only on a fundamental
right of privacy but on the right to life itself." Brief 27.
The appellants recognize that a century ago medical
knowledge was not so advanced as it is today, that the
techniques of antisepsis were not known, and that any
abortion procedure was dangerous for the woman. To
restrict the legality of the abortion to the situation where
it was deemed necessary, in medical judgment, for the
preservation of the woman's life was only a natural conclusion in the exercise of the legislative judgment of that
time. A State is not to b0 rc>proached, however, for a
past judgmental determination made in the light of thenexisting medical knowledge. It is perhaps unfair to
argue, as the appellants do, that because the early focus
was on the preservation of the woman's life, the State's
present professed interest in the protection of embryonic
and fetal life is to be downgraded. That argument denics the State the right to readjust its views and emphases in the light of the advanced knowledge and
techniques of the day.
C. Appellants argue that ~ 26-1202 (a) of the Georgia
statute, as it has been left by the District Court's decision, is unconstitutionally vague. This argument centers
in the proposition that, with the District Court's having
stricken the statutorily specified reasons, it still remains
a crime for a physician to perform an abortion except
when, as ~ 26- 1202 (a) reads, it is "based upon his best
clinical judgment that an abortion is necessary." The
10

Appell::m ts' Brirf 2.5.

70-40-0PINION
DOE v. BOLTON

11

appellants contend that the word "necessary" does not
warn the physician of what conduct is proscribed; that
the statute is wholly without objective standards and is
subject to diverse interpretation; and that doctors will
choose to err on the side of caution and will be arbitrary.
The net result of the District Court's decision is that
the abortion determination. so far as the physician is
concerned, is made in the exercise of his professional, that
is. his "best clinical'' judgment in the light of all the
attendant circumstances. He is not no>v restricted to
the three situations originally specified. Instead, he may
range farther afield wherever his medical judgment, properly a.nd professionally exercised, so dictates and directs
him.
The vagueness argument is set at rest by the decision
in United States v. l!uitch, 402 U. S. 62. 71-72 (1971),
where the issue was raised with respect to a District of
Columbia statute making abortions criminal "unless the
same were done as necessary for the preservation of the
mother's life or health and under the direction of a
com})etent licensed practitioner of medicine." That statute has been construed to bear upon psychological as
well as physiCaT We1T-6emg. 'l'li1s bemg so. the Cc;-;:;-rt
conCiuaed that the term "health" presented no problem
of vagueness. "Indeed, whether a particular operation
is necessary for a patient's physical or mental health is
a judgment that physicians are obviously called upon
to make routinely whenever surgery is considered." 402
U. S., at 72. This conclusion is equally applicable here.l
\Vhether, in the words of the Georgia statute, "an abortion is necessary," is a professional judgment that the
Georgia physician will be called upon to make routinely.
We a<Tree with the District Court, 319 F. Supp., at
1058,' that the medical judgment may be exercised in the
light of all factors-physiCal, emotional, psychological,
familiaL and the wo~s age-relevant to the well....---

--
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being of the patient. All these factors may relate to
health. T~Ys the attending physician the room he
1-;eea-s to make his best medical judgment. And it is
room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage,
of the pregnant woman.
D. The appellants next argue that the District Court
should have declared unconstitutional three procedural
demands of the Georgia statute: (1) that the abortion
be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals: 11 (2) that the
procedure be approved by the hospital staff abortion
committee; and (3) that the performing physician's
judgment be confirmed by the independent examinations
of the patient by two other licensed physicians. The
appellants attack these provisions not only on the ground
that they unduly restrict the woman's right of privacy,
but also on procedural due process and equal protection
grounds. The physician-appellants a1so argue that, by
subjecting a doctor's individual medical judgment to
committee approval and to confirming consultations, the
statute impermissibly restricts the physician's right to
practice his profession and deprives him of due process.
1. JCAH Accreditation. The Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals is an organization without
governmental sponsorship or overtones. No question
whatever is raised concerning the integrity of the organization or the high purpose of the accreditation process.u
We were advi~ rcl at r ra rgument , Tr . of Rearg. 10. ihnt onl~r 54
of Georgia's 159 r ounti rs haY<' n .TCAH nccreditccl ho8pital.
12
Since it ~ founding . .TCAH h n~ punmccl thr "rlu ~i\· r goal" of
clrfining the "optimal 'rtting" for "quality of ~ rrvi c r in ho ~ pitnls ."
J CAH. Accreditation l\bnual for Ho ~ pitn l s, Forcwnrd (Dec . 1970) .
The Manual's Introduction state" the org:mization's purpo ~ r to r~ t n b
lish standards and rondu rt accr edit;~tion programs that will afford
qua lity medical cnre "to gi\·r pntirnts thr optim:1l benefit s that medical science has to offer." This nmbitious nne! admirnbl e go:1l i ~
illustrated by .TCAII'M d rr i ~ im1 in 19Gfi " to rai ~ r nne! Htrrnglhcn the11
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That process. however, has to do with hospital standards
generally and has no present particularized concern "'ith
abortion as a medical or surgical procedure.' 3 In Georgia there is no restriction of the performance of nonabortion surgery in a hospital not yet accredited by the
JCAH so long as other requirements imposed by the
State, such as licensing of the hospital and of the operating surgeon, are met. See Georgia Code ~~ 88- 1901 (a)
and 88- 1905 (1971) and 84- 907 (Supp. 1971). Furthermore, accreditation by the Commission is not granted
until a hospital has been in operation at least one year.
The Model Penal Code, § 230.3, Appendix B hereto, contains no requirement for JCAH accreditation. And the
Uniform Abortion~ (Final Draft, August 1971) ,1 4 aP:
proved 0y the American Bar Association in February
1972,c ontain;-;1-;- JCAH accred1tea hospital specification.1G &meco~sllave held that a JCAH accreditastandards from their present ]eye[ of minimum e,·sentinl to the level
of optimum achien1ble . . . ." Some of these "optimum achievable"'
standards required are: disrlosnre of ho~ pitnl ownership and control; a dietetic service and writt en dietetic policies; a written disaster plnn for ma ss emergencies : a nuclear medica 1 services program ;
facilities for hem at olog~·, rlwmistry, mi rrobiology , clinical microscopy,
nnd se ro-immunolog~·; a profe,~ ion n llibrnry nne! document delivery
service; a radiology program : n social sen·ires plnn n dmini ~ t er rd by
a qualified social worker ; and a special cnre unit.
1
~ "Th e Joint Commi s~ ion neither ndvocntes nor oppose~ any
particular position with re~ p ect to electi\·e abortions." Letter dated
July 9, 1971 , from John L. Brewer , M. D., Commissioner, JCAH,
to the Rockefeller Foundut ion. Bri ef for amici, American College
of Obstetricians and Gyn ec ologi~ t s, et al. , p . A-3.
14 Sr e Roe v. Wad e. anti ' -, n . 40 .
1 " Some state statutes do not have the J CAH accreditation requirement. Ala ska Stat . § 11.15.060 (1970) ; Hawaii Rev . Sta t .
§ 453.16 (Supp . 1971) ; N . Y. P enal Code § 125.05.:{ (J\'fcKinnry
Supp. 1972-19n) . Wa shington haH the requirement but couples it
with the 11lt ernati\'e of " <L medical facility approved ... by the stat e
board of health." Wash . Rev. Code § 9.02.070 (Snpp. 1972). Florida's new statut e ha ~ a similar proYi ~ ioJl. Law of Apr. 13, 1072, c.
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tion requirement is an overbroad infringement of fundamcn tal rights because it docs not relate to the particular
medical problems and dangers of the abortion operation.
Poe v. Menghini, 330 F. Supp. 986, 993-994 (Kan.
1972); People v. Barksdale, 06 Cal. Rptr. 265. 273-274
(Cal. App. 1971).
We hold that the JCAH accreditation requirement does
not " ·ithstand constitutional scrut' n in the prescn ont~xt :. .
is a rcquiwncnt that simply is not "based on
differences that arc rcaso11ahly related to the purposes of
the Act in which it is found." Morey v. Dmul, 354 U. S.
457, 465 (1957).
This is not to say. as the appellants themselves concede, Brief 40. that Georgia may not or should not adopt
standards for licensi1)g all f;;i'lities where abortionslna:y
be performcdWrong as those standards arc legitimately
related to the objective the :State seeks to accompli~:<h.
The appellants conte11d that such a relationship would
be lacking even in a lcf'ser requirement that an abortion
be performed in a licensed hospital, as opposed to a facility, such as a clinic. that may be required by the :State
to possess all the staffing and services necessary to perform. an abortion safely (including those adequate to
handle serious complications or other emergency. or arrangements with a nearby hospital to provide such services). Appellants and various amici have presented us
with a mass of data purporting to demonstrate that some
institutions other than hospitals are entirely adeq~atc to
perform abortions if they possess these qualifications.

n

72-19(), § 1 (2). Othrr' ront:1in thr ~prrifirntion. Ark. Sl :1t. Ann .
§§ 41-803 to 41-310 (Supp. 1971); C:1l. Hr:dth nne! Safrt~· Coclr
§§ 2.1\l!i0-2 ,19.15 .•1 (\Yr~t Supp. 1972); Colo. Rrv. Stat~. Am1. §§ 402-50 to 40-2-ii::l (Prrm. Cum. Sttpp. 19()7); T<an. Stat. Ann.§ 21- 8047
(Supp. 1971); 1\Ttl. Ann. Cock Art. 4:~. §§ 1::l7-189 (Hrpl. 19i1).
Cf. Del. Codr Ann. §~ 1790-179:~ (Snpp. 1970) ~preil\ing '':1 nn1ionnll~· rrrog;nizrd mrdical or ho~pitnl .1rrrcditntion nnthorit~·,"

§1790(a).
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The State, on the other hand, has not presented persuasive data to show that only hospitals meet its acknowledged interest in insuring the quality of the operation
and the full protection of the patient. 'Ve feel compelled
to agree \\·ith appellants that the State must show more
than it has shown to prove that only the full resources
of a licensed hospital. rather than those of some other
appropriately licensed institntion, satisfy these health intm·ests. 'Ye hold that the hospital requirement of the
Georgia law is a so invalic .
n so 10 c wg we natillali'y
express no opinion on the medical judgment involved in
any particular case. that is. whether the patient's situation is such that an abortion should be performed in a
hospital rather than in some other facility.
2. Cmmnittee Approval. The second aspect of the
appellants' procedural attack relates to the hospital abortion comn1ittee and to the pregnant "·oman's asserted
lark of access to that committee. Relying primarily on
Goldberg v. Kelly, 307 U. S. 254 (1070), concerning the
termination of welfare benefits. and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1071), concerning the posting
of an alcoholic's name, Doe first argues that she >vas denied
clue process because she could not make a presentation
to the committee. It is not clear from the record, however, whether Doe's own consulting physician was or was
not a member of the committee or did or did not present her case, or, indeed. whether she herself was or was
not there. vVe see nothing in the Georgia statute that
explicitly denies access to the committee by or on behalf
of the woman. If the access point alone were involved,
we would not be persuaded to strike down the committee
provision on the unsupported assumption that access is
not provided.
Appellants attack the discretion the statute leaves to
the committee. The most concrete argument they advance is their suggestion that it is still a badge of infamy
"in many minds" to bear an illegitimate child, and that
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the Georgia system enables the committee members' personal views as to extramarital sex relations, and pullishment therefor, to govern their decisions. This approach
obviously is one founded on suspicion and one that disdoses a lack of confidence in the integrity of physicians.
To say that physicians will be guided in their hospital
committee decisions by their predilections on extramarital
sex unduly narrows the issue to pregnancy outside marriage. (Doc's own situation did not involve extramarital
sex and its product.) The appellants' suggestion is necessarily somewhat degrading to the conscientious physician,
particularly the obstetrician, whose professional activity
is concerned with the physical and mental welfare, the
woes, the emotions, and the concern of his female patients.
He, perhaps more than anyone else, is knovdeclgeable in
this area of patient care, and he is aware of human frailty,
so-called "error," and needs. The good physician-despite the presence of rascals in the medical profession, as
in all others, we trust that most physicians are "good"
-will have a sympathy and an understanding for the
pregnant patient that probably is not exceeded by those
who participate in other areas of professional counseling.
It is perhaps worth noting that the abortion committee
has a function of its own. It is a committee of the hospital and it is composed of members of the institution's
medical staff. The membership usually is a changing
one. In this way its work burden is shared and is more
readily accepted. The committee's function is protective.
It enables the hospital appropriately to be advised that
its posture and activities arc in accord with legal requirements. It is to be remembered that the hospital
is an entity and that it, too, has legal rights and legal
obligations.
Saying all this, however, does not settle the issue of
the constitutional propriety of the committee requirement. Viewing the Georgia statute as a whole, we see
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no constitutionally justifiable pertinence in the structure
~~
for the advance approval by the abortio~tee.
W1tlrngarcl tothe protccii(;D ~tru1tiallife, the medical judgment is already completed prior to the committee·
stage, and review by a committee once removed from diagnosis is basically redundant. We are not cited to any
other surgical procedure made subject to committee approval as a matter of state criminal law. The woman's
right to receive medical care in accordance with her licensed physician's best judgment and the physician's right
to administer it are substantially limited by this statutorily imposed overview. And the hospital itself is
otherwise fully protected. Under ~ 26-1202 (e) the hospital is free not to admit a patient for an abortion. It is
even free not to have an abortion committee. Further,
a physician or any other employee has the right to refrain,
for moral or religious reasons, from participating in the
abortion procedure. These provisions obviously are in
the statute in order to afford appropriate protection to the
individual and to the denominational hospital. Section
26-1202 (e) affords adequate protection to the hospital
and little more is provided by the committee prescribed
by ~ 26-1202 (b)(5).
We conclude that the interposition of the hospital abortion committee is unduly restrictive of the patient's rights
and needs that, at this point, have already been medically
delineated and substantiated by her personal physician.
To ask more serves neither the hospital nor the State.
3. 'l'wo-Doctor Concurrence. The third aspects of the
appellants' attack centers on the "time and availability
of adequate medical facilities and personnel." It is said
that the system imposes substantial and irrational roadblocks and "is patently unsuited" to prompt determination of the abortion decision. Time, of course, is critical
iu abortion. Risks during the first trimester of pregnancy arc admittedly lmver than during later mo11ths.

--
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The appellants purport to show by a local study ,r. of
Grady Memorial Hospital (servi11g indig0nt residents in
Fulton and DeKalb Counties) that the "mechanics of
the system itself forced ... discontinuation of th0 abortion process" because the median time for the vvorkup
was 15 days. The same study shmYs, however, that 27%
of the candidates for abortion were already 13 or more
w0eks pregnant at the tim8 of application, that is, they
wer0 at the end of or beyond the first trimester when they
made their applications. It is too much to say, as appellants do. that these particular p0rsons "were victims
of [a] system over which they [had] no control." If
higher risk was incurred because of abortions in the
second rather than the first trimester, much of that risk
was due to delay in application, and not to the alleged
cumbersomeness of the system. \Ve note, in passing.
that appellant Doc had no delay problem herself; the
decision in her case 'ms made well within the first
trimester.
It should b0 manifest that our rejection of the accredited hospital requirement and, more important, of
the abortion committee's advance approval eliminates the
major grounds of the attack based on the system's delay
and the lack of facilities. There remains, however, the
required confirmation by t"·o Georgia-licensed physicians
in addition to the recommendation of the pregnant "'OJnan's own consultant (making under the statute, a total
of six physicians involved. including the three on the
hospital's abortion committee). We conclude that this
provision. too, must fall.
The statute's emphasis, as has been repetitively noted,
is on the attending physician's "best clinical judgment
that an abortion is necessary." That should be sufficient.
IG L. lhkrr & \f. Frrrmun, Abortion Smn•ill:IJH'r n1 Grad~· 1\femorinl Hospit:1l Crntcr for Di~ca~c Control (.Tunc :1nd .Tuly 1971)
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The reasons for the presence of the confirmation step in
the statute are perhaps appare11 t, but they arc insufficient
to ·w ithstand constitutional challenge. Again, no other
voluntary medical or surgical procedure for which Georgia
requires confirmation by two other physicians has been
cited to us. If a physician is licensed by the State, he
is recognized by the Rtatc as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judgment. If he fails in this, professional
censure or deprivation of his license are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no
rational connection \Vith a patient's needs and unduly
infringes on the physician's right to practice. The attending physician will know when a consultation is advisable-the doubtful ::<ituation, the need for assurance
when the medical decision is a delicate one, aml the like.
Physicians have followed this routine historically and
knO\Y its usefulness and benefit for all concerned. It is
still true today that r] eliancc must be placed upon the
assurance given by his license. issued by an authority
competent to judge in that respect, that he [the physicianl possesses the requisite qualifications." Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114,122-123 (1889). Sec United
States Y. Vuitch, 402 U. S., at 71.
E. The appellants attack the residency requirement
of the Georgia law, ~ ~ 26-1202 (b) ( 1) and (b) (2), as
violative of the right to travel stressed in Shapiro Y.
Thompson, 394 U. S. 618. 629-631 (1969), and other
cases. \Vc~
travel right as such. One is no less free, because of the
statute, t~ ;;;;~r to depart from the State of Georgia.
Further, it cannot be said that the residency requirement might not have a possible relationship to the
availability of post-procedure medical care for the aborted
patient.
1'\evertheless, we do not uphold the constitutionality of
the residence reqUTremenl It ls not based on any policy

"r
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of preserving state-supported facilities for Georgia residents, for the bar also applies to private hospitals and
to privately retained physicians. There is no intimation,
either. that Georgia facilities are utilized to capacity in
caring for Georgia residents. Just as the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Const. Art. IV, ~ 2, protects persons
\\·ho enter other States to ply their trade, Ward v. Maryland, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870); Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239. 248-256 (1898). so must it protect persons who enter Georgia seeking the medical services that are available there. See Toomer "· Witsell, 334
U. S. 385, 396-397 (1948). A contrary holding would
mean that a State could limit to its own residents the
general medical care available within its borders. This
we could not approve.
F. The last argument on this phase of the case is one
that often ~ly, that the Georgia system is vlolativc of equal protection because it discriminates against
the poor. The appellants do not' urge that abortio"i1s
s'i10liiCfiJe performed by persons other than licensed physicians, so we have no argument that because the wealthy
can better afford physicians, the poor should have nonphysicians made available to them. The appellants acknowlcged that the procedures arc "nondiscriminatory
in ... express terms" but they suggest that they have produced invidious discriminations. The District Court rejected this approach out of hand. 319 F. Supp., at 1056.
:Ihe
nnan y on the accreditation and approval and
confirmation requirements, discussed above, and on the
assertion that most of Georgia's counties have no accredited hospital. We have set aside the accreditation, 1·
approval, and confirmation requirements, however, and
with that, the discrimination argument collapses in all
significant aspects.

·?
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The appellants complain, finally, of the District Court's
denial of injunctive relief. A like claim was made in
Roe v. Wade, ante. We declined decision there insofar
as injunctive relief was concerned, and 've decline it here.
"\Ve assume that Georgia's prosecutorial authorities will
give full recognition to the judgment of this Court.
In summary, '"'e hold that the JCAH accredited hospital provision and the requirements as to approval by
the hospital abortion committee, as to confirmation by
two independent physicians, and as to residence in
Georgia are all violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Specifically, the following portions of § 26-1202 (b), remaining after the District Court's judgment, are invalid:
(1) Subsections (1) and (2).
(2) That portion of Subsection (3) following the words
"such physician's judgment is reduced to writing."
(3) Subsections ( 4) and (5).
The judgment of the District Court is modified accordingly and, as so modified, is affirmed. Costs are
allowed to the appellants.

APPEXDI:X A
Crimil!al Code of Georgia
(The it:tlirizrd port ion~ are t ho~r held
Di~l riel Comt )

CHAPTEH 26- 12.

nnron~t it utiona.l b~·

the

ABORTION.

26- 120L Criminal Abortion. Except as otherwise
provided in section 26-1202, a person commits criminal
abortion when he administers any medicine, drug or
other substance whatever to any woman or when he uses
any instrument or other means whatever upon any woman
with intent to produc(• a miscarriage or abortion.
26-1202, Exceptio11. (a) Section 26-1201 shall not
apply to an abortion performed by a physician duly
licensed to practice medicine and surgery pursuant to
Chapter 84---9 or 84-12 of the Code of Georgia of 1933,
as amended, based upon his best clinical judgment that
an abortion is necessary because:
(1) A con ti11uation of the pregnancy would endanger
the life of the pregnant woman or would seriously and
permanently injure her health; or
( 2) The fetus woulrl very likely be born with a grave,
permanent, and irremediable mental or physical deject;
or
(8) The pregna11cy resulted from forcible or statutory
rape.
(b) No abortion is authorized or shall be performed
under this section unless each of the following conditions
'is met;
(1) The pregnant '"oman requesting the abortion certifies in writing under oath and subject to the penalties
of false swearing to the physician who proposes to perform the abortion that she is a bona fide legal resident
of the State of Georgia.
22
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(2) The physician certifies that he believes the woman
is a bona fide resident of this State and that he has no
i11formation which sholild lead him to believe otherwise.
(3) Such phys.ician'b judgment is reduced to writing
and concurred in by at least two other physicians duly
licensed to practice medicine and surgery pursuant to
Chapter 84-0 of the Code of Georgia of 1033, as amended,
·who certify in \\Titing that based upon their separate
personal medical examinations of the pregnant woman,
the abortion is, in their .i udgment, necessary because of
one or· more of the 1·rasons emunerated above.
( 4) Such abortion is performed in a hospital licensed
by the State Board of Health and accredited by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.
( 5) The performance of the abortion has been approved in advance by a committee of the medical staff
of the hospital in ·which the operation is to be performed.
This committee must be one established and maintained
in accordance with the standards promulgated by the
Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, and
its approval must be by a majority vote of a membership
of not less than three members of the hospital's staff:
the physician proposing to perform the operation may
not be counted as a member of the committee for this
purpose.
(6) If the woposed abortion is considered necessary
because the woman has been raped, the woman makes a
written statement under oath, and subject to the penalties
of false swearing, of the date, time aud 7Jlace of the rape
and the name of the rapist, if known. There must be
attached to this statement a certified copy of any report
of the rape made by any law enf01·cement officer or
agency and a statement by the solicitor general of the
judicial circuit where the r-ape occurred or allegedly occurred that, accordinu to his best information, there is
probable cause to believe that the rape did occur.
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(7) Such written opinions, statements, certificates, and
concurrences are maintained in the permanent files of
such hospital and are available at all reasonable times
to the solicitor general of the judicial circuit in which
the hospital is located.
(8) A copy of such written opinions, statements, certificates, and concurrences is filed with the Director of
the State Department of Public Health within ten (10)
days after such operation is performed.
(D) All written opinions, statements, certificates, and
concurrences filed and maintained pursuant to paragraphs
(7) and (8) of this subsection shall be confidential records and shall not be made available for public inspection
at any time.
(c) Any solicitor ueneral of the judicial circuit in
which an abortion is to be performed under this section,.
or any person who would be a relative of the child within
the second degree of consanguinity, may petition the superior court of the county in which the abortion is to be
performed for a declaratory judgment whether the performance of such abortion would violate any constitutional or other legal r~ghts of the fetus. Such solicitor
general may also petition such court for the purpose of
taking issue with compliance with the requirements of
this section. The physician who proposes to perform the
abortion and the pregnant woman shall be respondents ..
The petition shall be heard expeditiously and if the court
adjudges that such abortion would violate the constitutional or other legal rights of the fetus, the court shall
so declare and shall restrain the physician from performing the abortion.
(d) If an abortion is performed in compliance with
this section, the death of the fetus shall not give rise to
any claim for \vrongful death.
(e) Nothing in this section shall require a hospital to
admit any patient u11der the provisions hereof for the
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purpose of performing an abortion, nor shall any hospital
be required to appoint a committee such as contemplated
under subsection (b) ( 5). A physician, or any other
person who is a member of or associated with the staff
of a hospital, or any employee of a hospital in which an
abortion has been authorized, who shall state in writing
an objection to such abortion on moral or religious
grounds shall not be required to participate in the medical
procedures which v;·ill result in the abortion, and the
refusal of any such person to participate therein shall
not form the basis of any claim for damages on account
of such refusal or for any disciplinary or recriminatory
action against such person.
26-1203. Punishment. A person convicted of criminal abortion shall be punished by imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than 10 years.

APPE~DIX

B

American Law Institute

MODEL PEXAL CODE
Section 230.3. Abortion.
(1) Unjustified Abortion. A person who purposely
and unjustifiably terminates the pregnancy of another
otherwise than by a live birth commits a felony of the
third degree or, where the pregnancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth IYeek, a felony of the second degree.
(2) Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in terminating a pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the 11regnancy would
gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
mother or that the child would be born with grave
physical or mental defect. or that the ]Wegnancy resulted
from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse. All
illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of 16 shall be
deemed felonious for purpo:<:es of this subsection. Justifiable abortions shall be performed only in a licensed
hospital except in case of emergency when hospital facilities are unavailable. ·rAdditional exceptions from the
requirement of hospitalization may be incorporated here
to take account of situations in sparsely settled areas
where hospitals are not generally accessible.]
(3) Physicians' Certificates; Presumption from NonCompliance. No abortion shall be performed unless two
physicians, one of "·hom may be the person performing
the abortion, shall have certified in writing the circum.stances which they believe to justify the abortion. Such
certificate shall be submitted before the abortion to the
hospital where it is to be performed and, in the case of
abortion following felonious intercourse. to the prosecuting attorney or the police. Failure to comply with any
26
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of the requirements of this Rubsection gives rise to a
presumptio11 that the abortion was unjustified.
( 4) Self-A borlion. A " ·oman whose pregnancy has
continued beyond the t"·cnty-sixth "·eek commits a felony
of the third degree if she purposely terminates her own
pregnancy otherwise than by a live birth, or if she uses
instrumcn ts, drugs or violence upo11 hen:elf for that purpose. Except as justified under Subsection (2), a person
who incl urrs or knowingly aids a woman to use instruments, drugs or violence upo11 herself for the purpose of
terminating her pregnancy othenvise than by a live birth
commits a felony of the third degree whether or not the
pregnancy has continued beyond the twenty-sixth 'veek.
(5) Pretended A bort?'on. A ]Wrf"on commits a felony
of the third degree if, representing that it is his purpose
to perform an abortion, he docs an act adapted to cause
abortion in a pregnant woman although the woman is
in fart not pregnant, or the actor docs not believe she is.
A person charged with unjustified abortion under Subsection (1) or an attC'mpt to commit that offense may be
convicted thereof upon proof of conduct prohibited by
this Subsection.
(6) Distribution of Abortifacients. A person who
sells, offers to sell, possesses with intent to sell, advertises.
or displays for sale anything specially designed to terminate a pregnancy, or held out by the actor as useful for
that purpose, commits a misdemeanor, unless:
(a) the sale, offer or display is to a physician or druggist or to an intermediary in a chain of distribution to
physicians or druggists; or
(b) the sale is macle upon prescription or order of a
physician; or
(c) the possession is with intent to sell as authorized
in paragraphs (a) and (b); or
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(d) the advertising is addressed to persons named in
paragraph (a) and confined to trade or professional channels not likely to reach the general public.
(7) Section Inapplicable to Prevention of Pregnancy.
Nothing in this Section shall be deemed applicable to the
prescription, administration or distribution of drugs or
other substances for avoiding pregnancy, whether by preventing implantation of a fertilized ovum or by any other
method that operates before, at or immediately after
fertilization.
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